



# To moskeer i Norge

## - med blikk på kvinners status

**Human Rights Service (HRS)**

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Møllergt. 9, 0179 Oslo

Tlf. 22 33 80 00

[www.rights.no](http://www.rights.no)

[post@rights.no](mailto:post@rights.no)

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# **1 Innledning – på norsk**

## **1.1 Om prosjektet**

Denne rapporten har som målsetting å peke på verdier, først og fremst knyttet til kjønnsroller, som kommuniseres av muslimske menigheter gjennom den litteraturen som formidles av menighetene, og verdigrunnlaget til deres tilsluttede religionpolitiske organisasjon og politiske parti i Pakistan.

Utgangspunktet for rapporten er at Human Rights Service (HRS) kom i kontakt med en forsker fra Pakistan, som kun hadde vært i Norge kort tid. Forskeren reagerte på at den offentlige debatten i Norge er lite preget av de verdier som vedkommende mener blir forfeftet av pakistanske muslimske menigheter, da spesielt verdier i et kvinneperspektiv, og den mangelen på bevissthet om hvilke direkte både det er mellom menigheter her og islamistiske grupper i Pakistan.

Norge har hatt innvandring fra Pakistan i snart 40 år, og per i dag utgjør de den største innvandringsgruppen i Norge med i underkant av 30.000 mennesker. Likevel er det lite offentlig kjennskap til indre forhold i de pakistanske trossamfunnene om holdninger knyttet til kvinner og kvinners rolle.

### **Om prosjektlederen**

Forskeren som har vært prosjektleder hadde i utgangspunktet ingen planer om å være anonym, men har senere kommet til at bekjentgjørelse av egen identitet vil kunne gi negative konsekvenser sikkerhetsmessig og for mulighet for videre forskning på temaet. Vi har derfor valgt å publisere denne rapporten anonymt. Til dette vil vi bemerke at rapporten er finansiert av institusjonen Fritt Ord, som kjenner identiteten til de medvirkende.

Prosjektlederen er selv født og oppvokst i et muslimsk land. Prosjektlederen er universitetsutdannet, og har, foruten å ha undervist ved ulike skoler i opprinnelseslandet, arbeidet med tilrettelegging av jenters/kvinnens utdanning i rurale strøk i opprinnelseslandet, samt vært aktiv menneskerettighetsaktivist der. Prosjektlederen har særlig vært opptatt av religionpolitiske organisasjoner i sitt menneskerettighetsarbeid, det vil si organisasjoner med et ortodoks kvinnesyn og generelt en bokstavtro tolkning av koranen.

Prosjektlederen ble meget overrasket over at religionpolitiske grupper har etablert seg i Norge, da først og fremst representert ved de statsstøttede menighetene Islamic Cultural

Center (ICC) og Idara Minhaj-ul-Quran (IMQ), begge lokalisert med hovedbase i Oslo, men også med filialer i andre byer. Hun ønsket å få konkret innsikt i hvilket kjønnsperspektiv som formidles i disse menighetene, samt deres holdninger til demokrati i blant annet lys av jihad, det vil si hellig krig.<sup>1</sup> Begge menighetene ble besøkt flere ganger av forskjellige representanter fra HRS.

### **Islamic Cultural Center (ICC)**

ICC samlede offentlige økonomiske støtten i 2005 var på i overkant av 1,1 million kr. ICC har totalt 2 077 medlemmer, hvilket utløste 596 000 kr. i statlig støtte. Fra Oslo kommune fikk ICC økonomisk støtte for 1 552 medlemmer, til sammen ca. 420 000 kr. For de resterende medlemmene fra andre kommuner får menigheten 250 kr per medlem, hvilket utgjør i overkant av 130 000 kr.

ICC består av en moske, madrassa (islamsk skole), bibliotek, kontor og møterom. ICC presenterer seg selv som en islamsk organisasjon med følgende formål:

- Beskytte den islamske identitet i det muslimske samfunnet i Norge
- Beskytte den nye generasjon av norske muslimer fra "villfarelse"
- Bringe frem det islamske budskapet i norsk språkdrakt til "våre lokale velgjørere/donatorer" (dette blir oppfattet å være adressert til etnisk norske)

Muslimer som ikke tilhører noen muslimsk menighet ble oppfordret, via oppslag, om å bli offisiell medlem av ICC fordi ellers ville "deres skatt automatisk gå til den norske statskirken."

I samsvar med kjønnsdiskrimineringen til opphavsorganisasjonen, Jumaat Islami, er ICC kjønnssegregert og pro-hijab, som også ble observert av representantene fra HRS under besøk i moskeen.

Biblioteket ved ICC hadde rikholdig islamsk litteratur, det meste på urdu, som nesten uten unntak er publisert av Jumaat Islami i Pakistan, eller egne produksjoner.

### **Idara Minhaj ul-Quran (IMQ)**

IMQ fikk i underkant av 2,2 millioner kr. i økonomisk støtte i 2005. IMQ har totalt 3 898 medlemmer, og utløste i overkant av 1,1 million kr. i statlig støtte. Oslo kommune gir støtte

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<sup>1</sup> Jihad stammer fra det arabiske ordet *jahada*, som betyr «utvise det ytterste forsøk» eller «å streve». Ordet har en vid rekke med betydninger, fra åndelig indre kamp via å prøve å oppnå tro til hellig krig (Wikipedia.org).

for 3 127 medlemmer, i underkant av 841 000 kr. For de resterende medlemmene fra andre kommuner får menighetene 250 kr per medlem, altså i underkant av 200 000 kr.

I følge HRS' representanter, fremstår IMQ som kjønnssegregert, da menn og kvinner så å si aldri oppholder seg i samme rom i menigheten. Unntaket i så måte synes å være offentlige seminarer, som etter det HRS' representanter erfarer er tilrettelagt "til ære" for norsk media. Som eksempel henvises til et offentlig seminar som IMQ avholdt i forbindelse med diskusjoner i media om tvangsekteskap. På seminaret ble tvangsekteskap omtalt som ikke-islamisk, der det ble forklart at et ekteskap var kun gyldig hvis det var gjensidig samtykke fra både brud og brudgom.

Det ble observert at det ikke ble oppmuntret til kontakt mellom kvinner og menn. Det var forventet at kvinner bar hijab (ikke bare for fysisk tildekking av kroppen, men også for å unngå kontakt med "fremmede" menn). Dette fremkom både ved overtalelse og irettesettelse fra de eldre kvinnene. For å fremme hijab-kulturen var det mulig å få kjøpt billige hijab. Hijabene er sendt til IMQ fra det såkalte "Hijab House Project" som organiseres av Minhajul Quran i Pakistan.

HRS' representanter er av den formening om at det miljø og de verdier som IMQ representerer fremmer holdninger som er positive til tvangsekteskap. I denne sammenheng minnes det om at tvangsekteskap ikke bare involverer psykisk tvang, men også ideologisk tvang.

IMQ har et velfyllt bibliotek med islamsk litteratur, hovedsakelig publisert av hovedkvarteret i Pakistan. Litteraturen ble oppfattet som ensidig. Mesteparten var på urdu, men noe var på engelsk og litt på norsk.

### **Hvorfor denne rapporten?**

Innvandrings- og integreringspolitikk er gjort spesielt politisk betent, og det synes svært vanskelig å ha en åpen og fordomsfri debatt om dette feltet i Norge. I tillegg belemres ofte debatten ved aktørenes, ikke minst medias, ofte lite objektive formidling og/eller mangel på kunnskap. Men likevel er det kanskje det *religiøse aspektet* som skaper det største hinderet for debatten, da nettopp religion, særlig knyttet til islam, i liten grad kan debatteres (i et integreringsperspektiv) uten at det synes å skape avstand og beskyldninger om fiendtlighet

heller enn forståelse og kritisk refleksjon.<sup>2</sup> Vår oppfatning er at dette kan bidra til at vi utvikler parallelle samfunn i Norge, samfunn bestående av ulike grupperinger med liten samhandling, som igjen tilsier at storsamfunnet ikke vet hva som foregår innad i de ulike samfunnene. Dette kan gi ytterligere grobunn for distanse og uoverensstemmelse mellom ulike grupper i Norges befolkning. Utviklingen av parallelle samfunn er også uheldig i et menneskerettslig perspektiv, da det vil skape ulike rettigheter og plikter basert på for eksempel religiøs bakgrunn.

Ved dette prosjektet ønsket vi å åpne noen lukkede dører, som kan gi oss innsikt og ny viten om et miljø som offentligheten per i dag vet lite om.

Prosjektet tar høyde for å avdekke kjønnsroller via de to nevnte moskeens tilgjengelige litteratur (hovedsakelig kommunisert på urdu); det skrevne ord (bøker, pamfletter, tidsskrifter etc.), og fra audiovisuelle media (som lyd-kassetter og videoer), samt innholdet på grupperingenes websider. Disse to norske menighetene har beviselig formelle bånd religionspolitiske partier lokalisert i Pakistan.<sup>3</sup> Samtidig ønsket vi å få snakke med unge kvinner som har tilknytning til ICC og IMQ om hvordan de selv oppfatter kjønnsrollene kommunisert av disse menighetene, og om disse oppfatningene på noen måte er influert av de liberale kjønnsrollemønstrene i Norge. Ut fra dette har representanter for HRS deltatt på ulike arrangementer som ICC og IMQ har hatt i løpet av høsten/vinteren 2005. Dokumentasjon fra denne personlige deltakelse ved ulike religiøse og uformelle offentlige arrangementer, samt seminarer og undervisning i regi av disse to menighetene, ble lagt til grunn for analysen av den tilgjengelige litteraturen som finnes der.

Ingen av representantene fra HRS tilkjennega seg overfor de respektive menighetene. Begrunnelsen for dette var at de mente at menighetenes ledere med stor sannsynlighet ville motsette seg, om ikke motarbeide, en undersøkelse knyttet til kjønnsroller. Imidlertid er ikke menighetenes ledere sentral for oss i dette arbeidet, da arbeidet ikke er personfokuset. Det er menighetenes substansielle innhold og praksis av det som formidles, spesielt knyttet til hvilken litteratur de formidler, som er det sentrale.

### **Hva er kriteriene?**

Religion, familieliv og arbeidsmarkedet har stor betydning for hvordan kjønnsrollemønstret oppstår og utvikler seg. Vi valgte derfor spesielt å fokusere på kjønnsrollene i ekteskaplige

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<sup>2</sup> Til dette vil vi bemerke følgende: Dette er ordlyden slik den lød i HRS' søknad til Fritt Ord (juli 2005). Etter vår oppfatning har konfliktene rundt karikaturtegnningene av Muhammed, første gang publisert i den danske avisen Jyllands-Posten september 2005, ettertrykkelig bekreftet denne tesen.

<sup>3</sup> Se pkt. 1.2 og pkt. 2

forbindelser, og kvinnenes situasjon innenfor rammeverket av islam og islamske lover når det gjelder deltagelse på arbeidsmarkedet, og spørsmål angående arv og familiesaker, herunder hvilke omstendigheter som synes å råde hva gjelder avgjørelser i familiesaker som har med ekteskap og skilsmisse gjøre.

### **Rapportens begrensninger**

Rapportens grunnlag er den *tilgjengelige* litteratur (bøker, pamfletter, tidsskrifter etc), og audiovisuelle media som lydkassetter og videoer, innholdet på de respektive gruppenes websider, og unge kvinner vi møtte i moskeene under våre besøk. Dette tilsier selvsagt ikke at all litteraturen som er i moskeen, støttes og følges opp av alle de som tilhører menighetene.

Rapporten er skrevet på engelsk, ut fra at prosjektlederen ikke behersker fullgodt norsk. Avslutningskapitlet, inkludert et sammendrag av rapportens funn og forslag til tiltak, er derimot skrevet på norsk.

Den engelske delen av rapporten er språklig gjennomgått av oversetter og forfatter, Bruce Bawer.

## 2 Introduction

The leaders of mosques in Norway claim to be committed to women's rights. Sometimes they actually do things that seem to demonstrate such a commitment, as when they form women's wings in the mosques. The commitment, however, is entirely superficial. Scratch the surface and you'll find that the male-dominated mosque milieu does not even believe in equal rights for women. In this report, we have tried to scratch the surface a little to highlight the gender relations being preached and promoted in the mosques. Owing to time constraints, we studied mainly two mosques in Norway - *the Islamic Cultural Center, ICC*, and *the Idara Minhajul Quran, IMQ*. Both of these mosques are located in Oslo and are mostly run by Pakistani immigrants. The reason we chose these mosques is that ICC and IMQ are the overseas branches of two controversial Islamic political parties in Pakistan, *Jumaat Islami* and *Minhajul Quran* respectively. Before we look into the mosques, here is, first of all, some background information about Jumaat Islami and Minhajul Quran in Pakistan.

### 2.1 Background of Jumaat Islami in Pakistan

A conservative Islamic scholar, Abul Ala Maududi, established Jumaat Islami in British India in 1941. When the British relinquished control of the Indian subcontinent in 1947, it was divided into two independent countries, Pakistan and India, after which Jumaat Islami continued to function as a conservative Islamic political party both in India and Pakistan. In Pakistan, Jumaat Islami has never been a popular party. It has suffered landslide electoral defeats in all elections except in the 2002 general election.<sup>4</sup> Moreover, the party's credibility

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<sup>4</sup> Jumaat Islami is a major participant in the coalition of six Islamic political parties that is called *Mutahida Mujlas Aamal* (MMA). The alliance won elections in two of Pakistan's four federated regions, the Northwest Frontier Province (NWFP) and Baluchistan. MMA now rules NWFP and is part of a coalition government in Baluchistan. After coming into power, the MMA banned playing music in public transport. They forced private business to remove billboards and sign boards with faces and figures of women on. The MMA activists harassed musicians in the city of Peshawar and forced them to leave their homes in the old Peshawar city where the musicians' families have been living for more than a century. Political observers in Pakistan and abroad usually attribute the parties' victory in the two federated regions to factors other than the Islamic parties mass popularity. One factor is that the secular political parties of Pakistan, such as the Pakistan People's Party and the Pakistan Muslim League (N), were sidelined and their leaders, Benazir Bhutto and Nawaz Sharif, forced into exile by the country's current military leader, Pervez Musharaf. This created an open political arena and allowed Islamic parties to make inroads into the mainstream politics of Pakistan. The other factor is that before the elections in 2002, the US had attacked Afghanistan to topple the Taliban government. The US bombing of Afghanistan killed thousands of innocent Afghan civilians, destroyed villages, mosques and bombed wedding parties. This angered people in the neighboring federated regions of Pakistan, NWFP, and Baluchistan, whose people have cultural, ethnic, and even direct familial or blood ties to people in Afghanistan. Pakistan's military leader, Pervez Musharaf, supported the US attack on Afghanistan and also allowed the US to use Pakistani air space and air bases when bombing Afghanistan. By contrast, the religious alliance, MMA, was vehemently



in Pakistan has always been tarnished by the fact that its founder, Abul Ala Maududi, vehemently opposed the idea of and struggle for carving of an independent Muslim state out of the British India following the end of the British colonization. The party suffered another blow to its credibility when it supported the worst kind of military dictator Pakistan ever has had, General Zia ul-Haq (1977-88), especially his agenda to Islamize the country by introducing harsh Islamic laws into the penal code of Pakistan, and to stifle the country's secular political parties.

Nevertheless, Jumaat Islami is a highly disciplined party that stands for complete Islamic revolution all over the world and has contacts with global Political Islamic movements such as *Akhwanul Muslimin* in Egypt. This is one of the Egypt's oldest and most extremist Islamic political Movement/party. This party's ideology is just like Jumaat Islami's ideology: it stands for complete Islamic revolution all over the world. Now-a-days the party is under the foot of President Hussni Mubarak of Egypt, but there is clear indication that the party could come to power if Hussni Mubarak did not manipulate with democracy and there are free and fair election in Egypt.

One of Jumaat Islamis' objectives is to establish a common Muslim defence force to liberate what they perceive as the occupied Muslim lands of Palestine and Kashmir (Jones 2002). In Pakistan, the party stands for imposition of Sharia law, removal of interest payments on financial transactions, and enforcement of the harsh standards of Islamic "morality" on the media and the masses. Following is some information regarding the Jumaat Islami's stance on women's rights, political and ideological issues, and its various activities in Pakistan.

### **Polygamy**

The Jumaat Islami upholds polygamous marriages and considers polygamy beneficial to all human societies.<sup>5</sup> Its official website claims that 'polygamy of a sort is widely carried on in Europe and America. The difference is that while the Western man has no legal obligations to his second, third or fourth mistresses and their children, the Muslim husband has complete legal obligations towards his second, third or fourth wife and their children.'<sup>6</sup> Even if a woman is a "working lady and need no support, but be careful, life without husband will be a hell Life"<sup>7</sup>, argues the website. A woman must have a husband even if she is only one of several

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against the US bombing of Afghanistan. Therefore, the people in NWFP and Baluchistan vented their anger by voting the anti-US Islamic alliance, MMA, into power.

<sup>5</sup> <http://www.jamaat.org/islam/WomanPolygamy.html>

<sup>6</sup> *ibid*

<sup>7</sup> See in 'Family Issues' in 'Who is Right' in A and Q in the *Jumaat Islami* official website:  
<http://www.jamaat.org>

wives.

### **Views on Husband-Wife Relationship**

Part of the political and ideological agenda of the Jumaat Islami is to advocate a marital union in which the husband is completely dominant. According to the party, “the best role she can play in keeping the marital tie intact and strong, is to recognize her husband as the person responsible for the running of the affairs of the family, and thus to obey him even if his judgement is not acceptable to her”.<sup>8</sup> Her obedience should be particularly manifest in their sexual relations: “She can never deny bed-sharing (with the husband) unless it was physically not possible.”<sup>9</sup> ‘It is not essential that you (husband) always make financial decisions with the approval of your wife.’<sup>10</sup> Moreover, the party supports the husband’s unilateral right to divorce – in other words, he can divorce her at any time. If she wants to divorce him she has to request him to release her from the marriage or apply to an Islamic court to demand that the husband grant her a divorce.<sup>11</sup>

### **Stance on CEDAW**

The Jumaat Islami has vowed never to allow the government of Pakistan to implement the UN Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women, CEDAW.<sup>12</sup> It is pertinent to mention that the government of Pakistan has ratified CEDAW and is now under an obligation to the UN to implement CEDAW in the country.

### **Stance on Gender-Discriminatory Hadood (Islamic) Laws in Pakistan**

The *Hadood* ordinance is a set of gender-insensitive Islamic laws that were incorporated in the penal code of Pakistan in 1979 by the military dictator General Zia, with the proactive support of Jumaat Islami. The laws gave legal sanction to the existing low status of women in Pakistan and have multiplied grievous injustice of women victims of violence. For, example, according to the Hadood laws, the testimony of one man is equal to the testimony of two women in a court of law, and a rape victim must produce “four adult Muslim men” as witnesses to the crime. If she cannot produce the men, she will be prosecuted for adultery and the punishment for which under the Hadood laws is being stoned to death. Meanwhile, rapists go free for lack of evidence, because it is improbable that somebody would rape a woman in front of “four adult Muslim men”.

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<sup>8</sup> ‘Rights and Obligation’ on <http://www.jamaat.org/islam/WomanRights.html>

<sup>9</sup> ‘How to Proceed to *Khula*’ in ‘Family Issues’ in ‘And Q’ on the <http://www.jamaat.org/qa/>

<sup>10</sup> ‘Rights of Mother and Wife’ in ‘Family Issues’ in ‘A and Q’ on <http://www.jamaat.org/qa/>

<sup>11</sup> See topics under ‘Family Issues’ on <http://www.jamaat.org/qa/>

<sup>12</sup> Pakistan’s English daily *Dawn*, 11 April, 2005, in its news report ‘Plan to Hold Film Festival Opposed’

It has been a longstanding demand of women and human-rights groups in Pakistan to remove this ordinance from the penal code of Pakistan. Jumaat Islami strongly opposes the repeal of the Hadood laws and believes that such a repeal would be in contradiction with Islam. Once, at a conference convened by the government of Pakistan and feminist NGO's, the party's female activists tore apart banners and posters denouncing the Hadood laws.<sup>13</sup> The party's leader, Qazi Hussain Ahmad, praised the destruction of the banners and posters as "part of the struggle of the party's women workers to thwart any move against Islam".<sup>14</sup>

### **Stance on Family Planning**

The Jumaat Islami often assails the family-planning programmes of the government of Pakistan for promoting "sexual waywardness" in the country.<sup>15</sup> It also alleges that the government is receiving millions of dollars in aid for family-planning programmes, which is actually part of a global (read Western) agenda to implant sexual "indecent" among Pakistani youth.<sup>16</sup> The party does not even accept that Pakistan's population explosion is a contributory factor in the widespread poverty prevalent in Pakistan.<sup>17</sup> The population ratio has now exceeded 160 million people, an increase on 30 millions the last seven years.

### **Stance on Honour Killing**

In Pakistan, hundreds of women are subjected to so-called honour killings every year,<sup>18</sup> and yet 70 % of those who commit honour killings in the country escape without being punished under the law.<sup>19</sup>

It is not uncommon in Pakistan to hear leaders of Jumaat Islami belittling the problem of honour killing by arguing that the problem exists elsewhere in the world as well - and claiming that even the British royal family killed Princess Diana for reasons of honour: "Honour killing is not because of poverty or illiteracy. We were just discussing the killing of Princess Diana. The Britons know everything (about the "honour killing" of Diana) but they are concealing (the "real cause" behind Diana's death). The real cause comes out to be the honour (of the British royal family). Honour killing is not only a tradition here (in Pakistan) but the problem (of honour killing) exists everywhere (in the world)."<sup>20</sup>

<sup>13</sup> Pakistan's Urdu daily *Khabrain*, January 12, 2005.

<sup>14</sup> *Jumaat Islami's* Urdu daily, *Jasarat*, February 19, 2005.

<sup>15</sup> 'JI Women Wing Criticizes Ulemas Family Planning Moot,' in News Archive 2003-2005 on *Jumaat Islami* official website, <http://www.jamaat.org/>

<sup>16</sup> Ibid.

<sup>17</sup> 'Muslim Society, Family Planning and Economic Development' on *Jumaat Islami's* official website, <http://jamaat.org/Isharat/2000/ish082000.html>

<sup>18</sup> Please see any annual report of the Human Rights Commission of Pakistan.

<sup>19</sup> P. 240 in 'State of Human Rights in 2003' by Human Rights Commission of Pakistan.

<sup>20</sup> This statement was made by a female parliamentarian of *Jumaat Islami* in a discussion on violence against women arranged by an Urdu daily, *Jhang*, and published in *Jhang* on March 18, 2004.

### **Stance on Forced Marriages**

Families that force unwilling girls to marry represent a serious problem in Pakistan as well as in the Pakistani immigrant community in Norway. It is not uncommon to hear leaders of Jumaat Islami say that should a girl's and her parents' choices of whom she should marry collide, the parents' choice must be given preference over the girl's: "if a girl is given the right to freely choose a marriage partner, she will desert the parental family and go away with the man. If the marriage were unsuccessful, where would she turn then? Therefore, I think the parents' choice should be given preference over the girl's choice in marriage."<sup>21</sup>

### **Stance on veiling of women**

Women affiliated with the Jumaat Islami are required by the party's ideological disciplinary code to be veiled from head to toe with just their eyes visible when they are in public, in Norway called *niqab*. The demands and acts of the party leaders indicate that they might impose *hijab* on women in Pakistan, if ever they got the power to do so. For example, the party leadership has asked the government of Pakistan to make hijab mandatory for female government officials.<sup>22</sup>

The party leader, Qazi Hussain Ahmad, addresses female party members from behind the veil - a huge, thick curtain hanging between him and his party's female activists.<sup>23</sup> The party rejects the French ban on hijab and led a demonstration against the ban in front of the French embassy in Pakistan.

### **Stance on Woman as Imam**

Some months back, a Muslim woman in the U.S. led, as imam, a mixed-gender Friday worship service. To be an imam is a function that has been exclusively performed by men throughout Islamic history. Jumaat Islami's official newspaper, *Jasarat*, ridiculed this female imam and alleged that the women who arranged for her to lead the service were psychics.<sup>24</sup>

### **Stance on Women's Participation in Politics**

It always depends on the political expediency and never on the principle that women, just like men, have the sovereign right to participate in all levels of politics. If the Jumaat Islami wants to achieve a particular political objective by bringing women in to politics, it would do so. Otherwise, women are never involved into politics. The party's principle is that women's key functions take place within the four walls of the home and that public life belongs to men. The more women are restricted and secluded within the home, the better. Therefore, the party

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<sup>21</sup> Ibid.

<sup>22</sup> Urdu daily *Jhang*, December 4, 2005.

<sup>23</sup> Urdu daily *Jhang*, October 2, 2004.

<sup>24</sup> Urdu daily *Jasarat*, March 28, 2005.

sometimes simply directs its women activists to stay at home, recite from the Quran, and pray for the political success of the men of the party.<sup>25</sup>

Once, in a TV discussion in Pakistan, one of the party's veiled female activists, Samia Rahil, said that nowadays the women of Jumaat Islami are out in public for a purpose: "to bring all women who have left their homes for jobs in public places back into the home. Once this is done, we [the women of Jumaat Islami] will also retreat to our homes."<sup>26</sup> The Pakistani press has also reported derogatory remarks against women that have been uttered by the party's politicians. For example, one politician said that "women are like a 'sweet dish' and they must prove their worth rather than 'sensationalizing' the environment of the parliament."<sup>27</sup>

But should political expediency call for it, the party never hesitates to nominate veiled women to the parliament<sup>28</sup> or to take them into the streets for public demonstrations. For example, veiled Jumaat Islami women demonstrated in front of the French Embassy in Islamabad against the French ban on hijab.<sup>29</sup>

Moreover, the female workers of Jumaat Islami (who total 7,353)<sup>30</sup> have been promoting patriarchal gender norms through their writings in the press, especially the party-affiliated press,<sup>31</sup> and by establishing a network of female *madrassas* (Islamic schools) in Pakistan. The *madrassas* have provided religious education to 22,000 girls and have distributed Islamic literature worth 20 million<sup>32</sup> Pakistani rupees.<sup>33</sup>

### **Stance on Women and Sports**

The Jumaat Islami is against the public participation of women in mixed-gender sports. "The lustful eyes [of men] never look at the sport but at the curves of the female bodies (...) and mixed-gender sports are forbidden in Islam," argued an editorial in the party's newspaper, *Jasarat*.<sup>34</sup>

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<sup>25</sup> Pakistan's Urdu daily *Khabrain*, April 1, 2005.

<sup>26</sup> Our reporter personally heard the women saying this.

<sup>27</sup> Pakistan's English daily *The News*, August 26, 2003.

<sup>28</sup> Under Pakistani law, some seats in Parliament are reserved for women. The women are not directly elected by the people but nominated by the parties, whose nominated candidates are directly elected to the parliament. Therefore, *Jumaat Islami*'s women parliamentarians are not directly elected by the people of Pakistan but nominated by the party for reserved female seats. There are 6 *Jumaat Islami* women in Pakistan's parliament.

<sup>29</sup> Pakistan's English daily *Dawn*, January 1, 2005.

<sup>30</sup> This number is provided by Pakistan's Urdu daily *Jhang*, October 2, 2005.

<sup>31</sup> Urdu ,monthly *Tarjuman-I-Quran*, Urdu daily *Jasarat*, etc

<sup>32</sup> This number is provided by Pakistan's Urdu daily *Jhang* dated October 2, 2005.

<sup>33</sup> Currency of Pakistan. 1 NKR= approximately 8 Rs.

<sup>34</sup> Urdu daily *Jasarat*, April 5, 2005.

The party declares that mixed-gender sports lead to promiscuity.<sup>35</sup> Sometimes, the Jumaat Islami resorts to violence and vandalism to keep mixed-gender sports events from taking place. In April 2005, armed activists of the party (together with activists of some other religious organizations) attacked participants in a mixed-gender marathon in the city of Gujranwala in Pakistan, wounding several police officers who were protecting the participants and burning several vehicles parked nearby.<sup>36</sup>

### **Stance on Kite-Flying, Music, Dance and Women in Advertisements**

Kite-flying is inimical to Islamic culture and tradition<sup>37</sup> and God forbids music.<sup>38</sup> The Jumaat Islami supported a legislative bill that would have imposed a total ban on music and dance in all public places.<sup>39</sup> The bill was tabled in the provincial assembly of the Northwest Frontier Province (NWFP), a federated region of Pakistan. Similarly, the party supported a bill that would have punished companies for using women in advertisements.<sup>40</sup>

Neither of those bills was passed, owing due to stiff opposition on the part of secular parties in the legislative bodies. In NWFP, however, where Jumaat Islami is a partner in the ruling coalition of religious parties, music is banned on public transportation and Islamic extremists, those belonging to Jumaat Islami included, have destroyed all public billboards depicting women.

### **Jumaat Islami and Children in Politics**

The Jumaat Islami is the only political party in Pakistan that has asked its members and activists to bring their children to political demonstrations. The party has had at least one political rally against the US and its Muslim allies whose participants included hundreds of children, many of them minors, who were asked by the party leaders to boycott products made by the US and Jewish companies.<sup>41</sup>

### **The Party and the Media in Pakistan**

The Jumaat Islami argues that the media, especially the electronic media in Pakistan, are responsible for the rise in sexual crimes against women, because the media are promoting “obscenity, sexual perversion”, “Western cultural values”, and “secularism” in Pakistan, which

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<sup>35</sup> JI News Archive 2003-05 on the party’s website, <http://www.jamaat.org/>

<sup>36</sup> Pakistan’s English daily, *The News*, April 4, 2005.

<sup>37</sup> ‘*Shabab Milli* Hold Referendum on Kite-Flying,’ in JI Archive 2003-2005 on <http://www.jamaat.org/>.

<sup>38</sup> ‘Is Music *Haram*?’ in ‘Miscellaneous Issues’ in ‘Questions and Answers’ on <http://www.jamaat.org/>.

<sup>39</sup> Pakistan’s English daily *Dawn*, February 4, 2005.

<sup>40</sup> Pakistan’s English daily *Dawn*, April 10, 2005.

<sup>41</sup> “Children are Future of Muslim *Ummah*,” in JI Archive 2003-05 on <http://www.jamaat.org/>

in turn “excite” sexual emotions in the youth, leading to sexual violence, rape, etc.<sup>42</sup> The party leaders often demand that the government of Pakistan compel the media to adhere to “Islamic moral values”.<sup>43</sup>

### **Jihadi Connections of Jumaat Islami**

Pakistan’s interior minister has accused female activists of Jumaat Islami of having links with, or sheltering, two men who are wanted by the governments of Pakistan, the US, and Australia for their links with Al-Qaeda. One of them is Terrance Jack Thomas, an Australian convert to Islam, and the other is Khalid Sheikh Mohammad, a key Al-Qaeda terrorist now in US custody.<sup>44</sup> Jumaat Islami is known for being involved in the recruitment and training of *jihadis* (holy Islamic warriors) for global Jihad against the “infidels”.<sup>45</sup> Besides, allegations from others, Jumaat Islami leaders often express their passion for jihad. “We will promote Islamic identity through a culture of jihad,” said the Secretary-General of the party.<sup>46</sup>

*Hizbul Mujahedin* is the militant wing of the party that is involved in violent jihad (acts of terrorism) in Indian-held Kashmir.<sup>47</sup> The party publicly proclaims that it has a “martyrs’ fund” to support families of the jihadis killed in jihad. The party has links with, or at least sympathizes with, Islamic organizations worldwide that are suspected of having violent jihadi links. For example, the editorial in the party’s newspaper vehemently condemned the British government’s ban on two British-based Islamic organizations, *Hizb ut-Tahrir* and *Al-Muhajirun*, for preaching religious hatred.<sup>48</sup>

Many people in Pakistan often wonder why, since he is so obsessed with jihad, the party’s leader or his sons don’t wage jihad and get “martyred”? Why is it always the children of the poorest people who are killed in jihad? To this question, the party’s leader, Qazi Hussain Ahmad, has this answer: “I have got my own jihad front. Even in the armed forces everybody is not supposed to hold a gun and go to the front line.”<sup>49</sup>

Political observers in Pakistan have noted that despite having incited so many young men of

<sup>42</sup> “TV Channels and the Moral Crisis,” editorial in the party’s official Urdu newspaper, *Jasarat*, September 30, 2005.

<sup>43</sup> Secretary-General of *Jumaat Islami*’s Women Wing, as reported by the party’s Urdu daily, *Jasarat*, September 20, 2005.

<sup>44</sup> Pakistan’s English daily newspaper *The News*, August 17, 2004.

<sup>45</sup> Paper presented by Dr Rodney Jones, a US scholar, at a seminar, “Global Terrorism” sponsored by the Institute of Regional Studies, Islamabad.

<sup>46</sup> Urdu daily *Jasarat* dated August 27, 2005.

<sup>47</sup> Jones, Bennett. Own. 2002. *Pakistan, Eye of the Storm*, Lahore, Pakistan: Vanguard Books (Pvt) Ltd

<sup>48</sup> Urdu daily *Jasarat*, August 8, 2005.

<sup>49</sup> Interview with Qazi Hussain Ahmad, published in the monthly *Newsline*, November 2001, Karachi.

Pakistan to transport themselves to “paradise” in the fight against the “devilish agents of the US,” Qazi never misses any opportunity to do business with the Americans.<sup>50</sup>

### **Jumaat Islami and Political Violence in Pakistan**

In Pakistan, Jumaat Islami has long been accused of engineering pre-election “election stunts” and attacks on people and places who are considered by the party ideologues to be promoting “immorality.” These attacks are carried out by the party in order to win Muslims’ votes by convincing them that it is determined to rid society of “immoral evils.” For example, just before the August 2005 local elections in Pakistan, the party’s activists attacked guesthouses in the city of Lahore, claiming that they were actually brothels.<sup>51</sup> Similarly, on occasions when Jumaat Islami has joined with other religious parties in calling for strikes, party activists have forced businesses to stay closed on the day of the strike by, for example, threatening of violence, throwing gasoline bombs in front of shops, etc.<sup>52</sup> It is also not uncommon to find stick-wielding party activists demanding that shop owners keep their shutters down on the day of the strike.<sup>53</sup> Party activists have ransacked the places of worship of non-Muslims minorities in Pakistan. For example, they set a Hindu temple on fire to “express their sentiments” over an alleged desecration of the Quran at the hands of someone who the party activists thought was a Hindu. The presumed Hindu later turned out to be an innocent Christian who had been wrongly implicated in the alleged desecration under Pakistan’s infamous Blasphemy Law which punishes blasphemy against Islam with the death penalty.<sup>54</sup>

### **Overseas Branches**

Being a party that believes in a global Islamic revolution, Jumaat Islami has branches in many countries worldwide, and has also been noted by the Danish Sappho.dk.<sup>55</sup> The Jumaat Islami has close interactions with its overseas branches, which collect funds for the party.<sup>56</sup> Both in Pakistan and abroad, the party raises funds for violent jihad. These funds are deposited in the Kashmir Jihad Fund.<sup>57</sup>

Leaders of the party, including its chief, Qazi Hussain Ahmad, frequently visit the party’s overseas branches, including the one in Norway, which is called the *Islamic Cultural Center*

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<sup>50</sup> ‘Jumaat Islami Double Talk on Nuclear Issue Exposed’, by Nusrat Javed on website of *South Asia Tribune*, 2005.

<sup>51</sup> Pakistan’s English daily *The News*, August 31, 2005.

<sup>52</sup> Pakistan’s Urdu daily *Khabrain*, April 3, 2005.

<sup>53</sup> Pakistan’s Urdu daily *Khabrain*, April 1, 2005.

<sup>54</sup> Pakistan’s English daily *The News*, August 31, 2005.

<sup>55</sup> <http://www.sappho.dk/Den%20loebende/jamaat.htm>

<sup>56</sup> Ibid.

<sup>57</sup> Ibid.



(ICC). While he has been banned from entering both Belgium and Holland because of his “jihadi links,” he was allowed to enter Norway in 2004. He visited ICC and refused to discuss women’s rights with the head of Amnesty International in Norway.<sup>58</sup> Qazi viewed the proposed discussion as an “attack on Islam”.<sup>59</sup>

## **2.2 Jumaat Islami and Islamic Cultural Center (ICC) in Norway**

The Islamic Cultural Center (ICC) is located in Oslo and houses a mosque, a madrassa (Islamic school), a library, an office, and a meeting room. An introductory pamphlet put out by the ICC declares that this Islamic organization intends to:

- protect the Islamic identity of the Muslim community of Norway
- protect the new generation of Norwegian Muslims from “waywardness”
- convey the message of Islam in the Norwegian language to “our local benefactors” (apparently this is a reference to ethnic Norwegians)

True to the gender discriminatory ideology of its parent organization, Jumaat Islami, the ICC is gender-segregated and very pro-hijab, as was observed by consultants in HRS, who personally visited the mosque several times.

The ICC also offers classes in Islamic teachings to girls and boys. Pieces of writings on the ICC notice board, urges those Muslims who are not official members of any Islamic body in Norway to become official members of the ICC, because otherwise their tax deduction will automatically go to the state church.

The ICC library is stuffed with Islamic literature, most of it in Urdu, which is published by Jumaat Islami in Pakistan. The literature justifies gender discrimination and unmistakably alludes to violent Islamic jihad, as we will show in the following sections.

## **2.3 Background of Minhajul Quran in Pakistan**

The party *Minhajul Quran* came into being in Pakistan in the 1980’s as an Islamic movement with the objective of islamicizing the people in Pakistan through peaceful persuasion and spread of Islamic educational institutions, rather than through the use of violence. The party

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<sup>58</sup> “Pakistani Politician Makes the Rounds,” <http://www.aftenposten.no/english/local/article855480.ece>

<sup>59</sup> Ibid.

has a wide network of Islamic educational institutes – madrassas – in Pakistan.<sup>60</sup> The party leaders, including the founder and top leader, Tahirul Qadri, said repeatedly that the party would not be involved in politics. But after a few years the party did jump into politics. Today it is a religious political party that has been repeatedly rejected by voters in Pakistan in all of the elections held since that time.<sup>61</sup> Like the leader of Jumaat Islami, Tahirul Qadri also supported general Zia ul-Haq's implementation of harsh Islamic laws into the penal code of Pakistan, and to stifle the country's secular political parties.<sup>62</sup>

Unlike Jumaat Islami, this party has apparently never been accused of having violent jihadi connections in Pakistan or abroad. But it supports the goal of Islamic revolution in Pakistan and around the world. Moreover, the party endorses gender hierarchy and sexual segregation in all walks of life. Below is some information about the party's position on gender issues.

### **Women's Participation in Politics**

Like Jummat Islami, the party denies that women, like men, have a sovereign and unalienable right to participate in all level of politics. A woman is not qualified to be head of government or of state because she is influenced by the "emotional turmoil" she undergoes owing to the monthly menstrual periods that render her incapable of making sound judgments.<sup>63</sup> Her duties as head of state or government, moreover, might interfere with her primary domestic duties.<sup>64</sup> It is argued that Islam disapproves of female heads of state.<sup>65</sup>

### **Disinformation and Denial**

The Minhajul Quran has disseminated a good deal of staggering information without providing any source. Here are a few examples. US forces in Iraq have gang-raped 5,000 Iraqi Muslim women.<sup>66</sup> The Western feminist movement has concluded that biological facts hinder the equality between woman and man and that the human genetic code must therefore be altered to create a new biological system to achieve equal rights for women.<sup>67</sup>

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<sup>60</sup> Human Rights Service visited one of these madrassas in Gujrat in 2004, and was deeply shocked by the conditions the young girl student were living under and the poor teaching situation (See the report, *Ute av syne, ute av sinn. Norske barn I utlandet*, HRS 2004).

<sup>61</sup> Although the political wing of the party has apparently been given a new name: Pakistan *Awami Tehrek*, PAT, with Tahirul Qadri as the formal leader of the party.

<sup>62</sup> Islam i Vesten. På koranens vej?, s.61 (Tiderne skifter 2002).

<sup>63</sup> "Women and Politics," on <http://www.minhajsisters.com/home/articles/index.minhaj?dir=&id=9>

<sup>64</sup> Ibid.

<sup>65</sup> Ibid.

<sup>66</sup> Monthly *Dukhtaran-I-Islam*, August 2005: <http://www.minhaj.info/ww1/main/index.minhaj?month=2005-08>

<sup>67</sup> Monthly *Dukhtaran-I-Islam*, January 2005

One of the most embarrassing facts about Islam is that its founder, Muhammed, married a 9-year-old, Aisha, when he was above 50 years old. Many Muslim scholars defend the marriage. Literature disseminated by Minhajul Quran argues that Aisha was not 9 but 16 to 18 years old when Muhammed took her as a wife.<sup>68</sup> Ironically, however, leading party activists admit in other publications<sup>69</sup> that Muhammed did marry Aisha when she was 9 and justify this marriage. It has to be mentioned that after the revolution in Iran, Ayatollah Khomeini introduced 9 year as legal marriage age for girls, due to that the founder of Islam, Muhammed, is seen as an example to follow in every aspect of life.

### **Coeducation**

Women can enhance their capabilities if, and only if, they have had the opportunity to receive an education in sex-segregated educational institutes, argues Tahirul Qadri, the leader of Minhajul Quran.<sup>70</sup> The party ideology highly disapproves of coeducation.

### **Divorce**

The party ideology, like that of Jumaat Islami, rejects women's equal right to divorce on the assumption that they are more emotional than men and might "abuse" the right to divorce in a state of anger.<sup>71</sup> The party also defends Islamic divorce whereby men can divorce women at will, but women are denied the same right.<sup>72</sup> She can, however, ask her husband to divorce her or ask the judge of an Islamic court to divorce her from her husband.

### **Woman as Witness in a Court of Law**

The party defends the low Islamic legal status of woman whereby two women are equivalent to one man as witnesses in a court of law.<sup>73</sup>

### **CEDAW and UN Beijing Agenda**

The party completely rejects the UN Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women, CEDAW, and the UN Beijing agenda for women's rights, as part of the Western conspiracy against the Islamic family.<sup>74</sup>

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<sup>68</sup> Monthly *Dukhtaran-I-Islam*, June 2005

<sup>69</sup> *Azwaj-I-Mutaharat and Banat-I-Tayabat*, p.20

<sup>70</sup> "Women's Role in an Islamic Society." Tahirul Qadri gave a speech on this topic that is recorded in an audiocassette. We managed to obtain this cassette from a Minhajul Quran institute in Pakistan.

<sup>71</sup> Ibid.

<sup>72</sup> Ibid.

<sup>73</sup> Ibid.

<sup>74</sup> "People's March and Women's Rights Rally," PAT 79. This is a videocassette that can be bought in various local offices of Minhajul Quran in Pakistan and abroad, and is also available in their IMQ in Oslo.

## Hijab

The party nurtures and promotes a hijab culture, although, unlike Jumaat Islami, it argues that a woman's face, hands, and feet may be visible in public. Our reporters, however, have observed that most of the women in Minhajul Quran wear the veil in the same way as Jumaat Islami's women: in both parties, the women are veiled from head to toe with only their eyes visible.

Minhajul Quran runs a massive "Hijab House Project", which seeks to promote a culture of hijab in the Muslim societies in Pakistan and in the Muslim Diaspora.<sup>75</sup> The project's objectives are as follows:<sup>76</sup>

- to arrest the growing "hijablessness" among Muslim women through pro-hijab literature, lectures, and other forms of verbal persuasions
- to manufacture hijab in great variety: party-hijab, marriage-hijab, workplace-hijab, ordinary-hijab, made-up-hijab, hijab studded with diamonds, etc.
- to distribute the hijabs free or at discounted prices
- to transport the hijabs abroad to Minhaj-affiliated mosques and distribute them free or at a discount to Muslim women in foreign countries

## Overseas Branches

Minhajul Quran is working in 75 countries all over the world.<sup>77</sup> In Europe, mosques affiliated with Minhajul Quran can be found in Germany, Britain, Spain, France, Denmark, and Norway. All these mosques regularly interact and coordinate among themselves. In Norway, the Minhaj-linked mosque is *Idara Minhajul Quran* (IMQ).

### 2.4 Minhajul Quran and Idara Minhajul Quran (IMQ) in Norway

The main Idara Minhajul Quran (IMQ) is in Oslo. It offers classes in Islam to men and women. It nurtures and promotes a culture of segregation: men and women almost never mix. Sometimes they mix when, for example, a public seminar is arranged, mostly for the consumption of the Norwegian media, authorities and organisations. For example, when the media discussion of forced marriages intensified, the IMQ held a public seminar<sup>78</sup> on the issue, where forced marriage was described as un-Islamic: a marriage, it was explained, could only be contracted with the mutual consent of both bride and groom. We observed,

<sup>75</sup> Monthly *Dukhtaran-I- Islam*, January 2005

<sup>76</sup> Ibid

<sup>77</sup> The information is taken from the website of Minhajul Quran:

<http://www.minhaj.org/home/ideology/index.minhaj?dir=ideology&e=1133484066>

<sup>78</sup> The seminar was held in December 2003.

however (actually, anyone who visits IMQ could observe this), that contacts between men and women are discouraged to the utmost and women are made to observe hijab (which involves not just covering the body but also avoiding contact with unrelated men) through persuasion and, sometimes, reprimands by elderly women in the mosque.

To promote hijab culture, the IMQ actually sells hijabs (head covers) at throwaway prices. Obviously, these hijabs are sent to IMQ under the auspices of the "Hijab House Project" of Minhajul Quran in Pakistan.

How, then, do men and women freely consent to marriage when contact between them are proactively discouraged? No matter how hard IMQ tries to assert that forced marriages are un-Islamic, the media in Norway need to be vigilant: The kind of milieu nurtured in the mosque is just right for forcing people into marriage. We have to remember that a forced marriage involves not just physical but ideological compulsion.

Moreover, IMQ has a library mostly stocked with Islamic literature, published by Minhajul Quran in Pakistan. Most of the literature is in Urdu, but some is in English and Norwegian. The literature, as we will show in the following sections, is highly objectionable on the subject of women's rights as well as in its references to violent jihad (Islamic holy war).

### **3 Methodology**

Our methodology is bisected. We visited the two mosques in Oslo; the Islamic Cultural Center, ICC, Norway and Idara Minhajul Quran, IMQ, several times to study available literature in the two mosques library. We attended different arrangements which also included the Friday-praying. These visits were consistent due the wintertime 2005/2006.

#### **3.1 Literature**

We looked into the literature being offered to public in the mosque libraries in order to get a sense of what kind of gender relations were being recommended to men and women there. The literature included books, periodical magazines, cassette bands, videotapes and other informations as posters, banners etc. Most of the available information was in urdu, some in english and nearly nothing in norwegian. The literature was then appraised after those central criteria listed in chapter 1.

The libraries contain patriarchal literature that promotes a male-dominated Islamic society that demonizes everything contrary to their values, like the notion of gender equality, and Western social values.

The libraries also spread hate material that encourages violent jihad against non-Muslims and “wayward Muslims” – Muslims who don’t approve of violent jihad. The libraries did not present information or literature by Muslim (or non-Muslim) writers that upholds a different worldview, one that calls for gender equality and rejects the notion of violent jihad.

More information on literature and information from the libraries is in the following sections.

### **3.1 Talk with Women Affiliated with Mosques**

Our reporters managed to have some talks with women who are affiliated with the mosques to find out about their view of Islam, especially women’s rights in Islam. We must emphasise that they were not part of a fixed interview.

The talks revealed that there was a “dangerous” complacency in the women’s attitude towards their rights under Islam -- dangerous in the sense that they didn’t reflect on the fact that the available literature represented mortification for their rights.

With some exceptions, they were generally unaware of what life is like, in terms of gender equality, in a society such as Norway’s. We did, however, note that some younger girls, when engaged in deeper discussions, did question the institutionalized gender hierarchy in Islam. For example, they didn’t understand why a Muslim girl who did not have a brother couldn’t inherit all the property of her parents under Islamic law.

## **4 Main findings**

### **4.1 Inheritance of Property, Bride Price, and Spousal Support**

The Quran (Chapter 4:11) says:

*“Allah enjoins you in the matter of (inheritance of property to) your children: the male will have as much as the portion of two females.”*

The literature from the mosques supports the discriminatory Islamic law of inheritance of property on the grounds that a woman’s share in the inheritance is compensated for by a

woman's right under Islamic law to a bride price (called *meher*) and to financial support by her husband.

The bride price, or meher (money, property, etc., that a woman is entitled to take from her husband at the time of marriage), strips the woman of a basic human right: control over her body.

The Quran (chapter 4:24) says:

*“And from the enjoyment (sex) you have received from them (women) give them their dowers (meher) stipulated.”*

There is also the following saying, which is attributed to Muhammed. A man from Ansar, named Basrah, said: “I married a virgin woman in her veil. When I entered into her, I found her to be pregnant. I mentioned this to the prophet. The prophet said: she will get the dowry (meher), for you made her vagina lawful for you. The child will be your slave. When she has begotten (the child), flog her.”<sup>79</sup>

Without a meher, a man cannot have sex with the woman he marries. After meher has been paid, or at least agreed upon between the two parties in accordance with Islamic law, the husband enjoys an absolute right over his wife's body. In other words, she can never deny him sex. This explains why the notion of marital rape simply does not exist in Islam and why Islamists deny that marital rape could ever occur within a Muslim marriage. Hence some literature in the libraries argues that the notion of marital rape is pure madness.<sup>80</sup>

The right to be maintained by one's husband under Islamic law, moreover, entails a corresponding duty on the part of the wife: to be obedient. The Quran (chapter 4:34) says:

*“And those wives whose refractoriness you fear, admonish them, and avoid them in bed and beat them. But if they obey you, do not seek a way against them.”*

In the mosque libraries there is literature that demonizes more gender-equal Western laws and that glorifies gender-discriminatory Islamic laws. One hadith says: “A man will not be asked why he beat his wife.”<sup>81</sup> Thus, under the Islamic law of inheritance and marriage, a woman is cheated on thrice: one, she is stripped of her half-share in the family inheritance; two, she forfeits control over her sexual life; three, her will is subjected to her husband's.

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<sup>79</sup> Book 11, number 2126, *Abu Daawud*

<http://www.usc.edu/dept/MSA/fundamentals/hadithsunnah/abudawud/011.sat.html>

<sup>80</sup> Monthly *Meesaq*, p.8, October 1997 (ICC library).

<sup>81</sup> Book 11, number 2124, *Abu Dawud*,

<http://www.usc.edu/dept/MSA/fundamentals/hadithsunnah/abudawud/011.sat.html>

In our discussions with some women in the mosques we learned that they prefer the Islamic laws to the Norwegian laws. We also noted, however, that some young women in the mosques were sceptical about the Islamic laws, but could not articulate an argument for summarily rejecting the discriminatory Islamic laws.

## 4.2 Marriage with Free Consent

The founder of Islam, Muhammed, is believed to have said: "There is no marriage without the permission of a guardian."<sup>82</sup> The literature in the mosque library of ICC rejects (sometimes directly and sometimes indirectly) a marriage entered into by a man and a woman after a period of consultation to get to know each other.

The literature argues that a "young man should acquire all information about his prospective wife through his mother, sisters, aunts etc." and never meet her prior to the marriage.<sup>83</sup> This clearly implies that the family elders, rather than man and woman choosing each other, should arrange the marriage. It also rejects love matches or dating, which is seen as paths to "social anarchy and sexual waywardness."<sup>84</sup> The literature urges Muslim parents to arrange marriages for their children as soon as they reach puberty, without taking into consideration the children's educational or career goals.<sup>85</sup> Specifically, in the case of girls, the literature argues that a marriage is not valid if the bride entered into it without the permission of her male guardian (normally her father), and criticizes the decision of a high court in Pakistan that declared that an adult Muslim woman could contract a marriage without the consent of a guardian.<sup>86</sup>

Many Muslim immigrant parents in Norway arrange marriages for their children in their countries of origin. While a marriage based on a collectivistic decision not necessarily is an illegal and forced marriage, it has been reported many instances of forced marriages among immigrants the last years. It appears that parents who decide marriages for their children, or force them into marriages, seek religious justification for their actions in the saying of Muhammed and the literature cited above.

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<sup>82</sup> Book 11, number 2080, *Abu Dawud*,  
<http://www.usc.edu/dept/MSA/fundamentals/hadithsunnah/abudawud/011.sat.html>

<sup>83</sup> *Tarjuman-I-Quran*, January 2003, p.96 (ICC library)

<sup>84</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>85</sup> Monthly *Tarjuman-I-Quran* August 2004, p.33-45 (ICC library)

<sup>86</sup> *Feminism Movement and Islam*, p. 191-211 (ICC library)



The women we talked to were aware that it is prohibited under Islamic law for them to marry a non-Muslim man. They said this is fine, although they meant that non-Muslim ethnic Scandinavian men make better husbands, if gender equality is concerned, than Muslim men.

### **How to Avoid Love?**

People fall in love. This is natural. In radical Islamic environments, love between men and women is not tolerated. Efforts are thus made to prevent pre-marital romances by restricting opportunities for men and women to meet; post-marital affairs, meanwhile, are addressed by according the husband sweeping powers over his wife, including his Quran-given right to keep her in her place through physical beating, polygamy, and his unilateral right to divorce.

Why is Islam so intolerant of love? According to Fatima Mernissi, a Moroccan scholar, the Muslim God is jealous of anything that interferes with man's devotion to Him.<sup>87</sup> Love interferes with this devotion, and therefore there are established means of preventing love between men and women: gender segregation, polygamy, a divine promise of 72 virgins in the life hereafter as a reward for resisting romantic temptations in this world.

In this connection, we found some literature in the mosque libraries that sets forth guidelines on how to rid oneself of romantic feelings.<sup>88</sup> The guidelines as follows: "Stay away from your beloved. Do not contact her/him. Do not meet her/him. Do not sit with her/him. And do not even look at her/him. Persuade yourself that this (love) is a chaos generated by the Devil." "The feelings of love, when they surge, can be controlled by thinking about what will happen to the dead body of your beloved when she/he dies. Her/his dead body will decompose and be eaten up by insects. What will happen if his/her dead body cannot be buried for days? The body will stink! Will you then want to go near the stinking body?" "Remember God and Muhammed each time your desire to see the beloved feels insurmountable. Recite verses from the Quran and sit in the company of pious people."

## **4.3 Polygamy**

The Quran (chapter 4:3) says:

*"Marry women such as please you (men) by two, three, or four, but if you apprehend that you shall not be able to act equitably, then marry one only."*

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<sup>87</sup> Fatima Mernissi, 2003

<sup>88</sup> Monthly *Tarjuman-I-Quran*, November 1998, p. 73 (ICC library)

This commandment of the Quran makes all Muslim men potentially polygamous. The libraries contain dozens of booklets, some of them even in Norwegian,<sup>89</sup> that explain the supposed “benefits” of polygamy to mankind.

#### 4.4 Wife-Beating

The Quran (chapter 4:34) says:

*“And those wives whose refractoriness you fear, admonish them and avoid them in bed and beat them, but if they obey you, do not seek a way against them.”*

The literature in the mosque libraries forcefully defends a man’s “right” to beat his wife, as granted by the above verse of the Quran. The literature says that a husband is like a state -- just as all citizens are obligated to obey the laws of the state, so are all wives bound to obey the code of conduct set up by their husbands. In short, women should adopt an attitude of submissiveness and docility toward their husbands.<sup>90</sup> If a wife rejects her husband’s authority, he has the right to beat her.<sup>91</sup>

It is relevant to mention that a recent report by the United Nations Population Fund reveals that many women in the world believe that wife-beating may be justified for reasons such as refusing to have sex or not preparing food on time.<sup>92</sup> While most of the mosque-affiliated women that we talked to said that wife-beating is not acceptable under any circumstances, we suspect that the problem does exist in these communities. The basis for this suspicion is that there exists both a cultural and an ideological foundation for wife-beating in the mosques: by cultural foundation, we mean that most Muslim immigrants in Norway come from, and still have extensive contacts with, cultures in which wife-beating is a norm; by ideological foundation, we mean that the Quranic verses cited above clearly allow men to beat their wives if they are disobedient. The religious literature in the mosque libraries that supports wife-beating further reinforces this ideological foundation (op.cit).

#### 4.5 Divorce

Under Islamic law, men enjoy an unfettered, unilateral right to divorce. But women do not have such a right. A woman can ask her husband to divorce her or can ask a judge on an Islamic court to dissolve her marriage.

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<sup>89</sup> *Polygami (Flerkoneri) i Islam* (ICC library).

<sup>90</sup> *Renaissance*, May 2000, p.46-50 (ICC library)

<sup>91</sup> Ibid.

<sup>92</sup> “State of the World Population,” at [http://www.unfpa.org/swp/2005/pdf/en\\_swp05.pdf](http://www.unfpa.org/swp/2005/pdf/en_swp05.pdf)

Most of the literature on divorce in the mosque libraries totally rejects the idea of woman's equal right to divorce on the ground that it would increase the divorce rate. "A woman is more emotionally unstable than a man and therefore will exercise the right to divorce only to regret it soon afterwards,"<sup>93</sup> argues the literature.

If women enjoyed equal divorce rights, they would desert their children, homes, and husbands with an angry shake of the fist, departing with gold and cash to marry a new man, or to return home to become a financial and emotional liability for their parents.<sup>94</sup> Regrettably, some literature also rejects divorces obtained in courts of law and instead recommends that couples should turn to close family members to help resolve their dispute.<sup>95</sup>

We also noted that during the Quran classes in the mosques, the girls and women were taught about Islamic divorce but not about divorce under Norwegian law. The women and girls that we talked to had no clue about Norwegian divorce law, including the change in the divorce law that makes it obligatory for spouses to recognize each other's right to a religious divorce at the time of marriage. When a Muslim woman divorces under Norwegian law, she is still considered to be married, if her divorce has not been sanctioned by an imam under Islamic law. It is usually difficult for a Muslim woman to obtain an Islamic divorce from an imam.

### **Hilala**

There is another important human-rights violation that is sometimes triggered by Islamic divorce law. It arises as a consequence of the following Quranic verse (chapter 2:230):

*"If he [a husband] divorces her [a wife], she is not lawful for him thereafter [i.e., they are not allowed to remarry] unless she weds a [new] husband other than him [the former husband]."*

Islamic law, then, forbids the remarriage of a divorced wife and husband. The only way to overcome this prohibition is through something called *Hilala* – the divorced wife has to marry a second husband, who must then divorce her; only then may she remarry her first husband.

In Pakistan, there have been cases of husbands divorcing wives in fits of anger and afterwards wanting to remarry them. In order to meet the Islamic requirement of Hilala, the wives were forced into the "intermediary marriages" only to be divorced by the new

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<sup>93</sup> *The Feminist Movement and Islam*, p.245 (ICC library).

<sup>94</sup> Ibid.

<sup>95</sup> ibid

“intermediary” husbands so that they might remarry their former husbands.<sup>96</sup> This Islamic law has been a source of humiliation and mental torture for both women and men in Pakistan.

#### 4.6 Women as Chaos - and Segregation

According to Fatima Mernissi, Islam views women as active sexual beings and considers the Muslim female to be endowed with a fatal attraction that erodes a man’s will to resist her and forces him to succumb to temptation.<sup>97</sup> Therefore the founder of Islam, Muhammed, has identified women as an affliction or source of chaos for men: “The prophet said: I have not left any affliction more harmful to men than women.”<sup>98</sup>

To protect men from women’s disruptive sexual power, Islam calls for control over female sexuality by means of segregation (which eliminates opportunities for men and women to meet) and hijab (which, on those occasions when women do have to encounter men, is meant to prevent sexual attraction from taking place).

Literature in the mosque libraries glorifies both sexual segregation and hijab. It calls on women to refuse all kinds of contacts with any unrelated man, even if the man is a “domestic servant, family chauffer, doctor, tailor, teacher or a friend of husband” and to avoid taking jobs in places where men work, because free mixing of gender leads to “sexual chaos”.<sup>99</sup>

The literature urges the Muslim women to reject the social norm of free mixing between men and women, which are spreading in the Muslim societies “under the influence of the immoral Western civilization”.<sup>100</sup> The literature proclaims that observing of hijab by women is “equivalent to the waging of violent jihad by men”.<sup>101</sup> It rejects the French ban on hijab, insisting that “God has commanded women to observe hijab and that no one has the right to make Muslim women defy the law of God”.<sup>102</sup> The literature also tells the stories of females who began wearing hijab after converting to Islam.<sup>103</sup>

Our consultants who visited the mosques observed that a culture of sexual segregation and hijab is actively encouraged, promoted, and even enforced in the mosques. There are

<sup>96</sup> A contributor to this report personally knows of such cases in Pakistan.

<sup>97</sup> Mernissi, p.27-45

<sup>98</sup> Volume 7, Book 62, Number 33, *Sahih Bukhari*, at <http://www.usc.edu/dept/MSA/fundamentals/hadithsunnah/bukhari/062.sbt.html>

<sup>99</sup> *Women’s Movement and its Negative Impact in the Light of Human Wisdom and Sharia* (ICC library)

<sup>100</sup> *ibid.*

<sup>101</sup> *Aayat-I-Satar-O- Hijab*, p.19 (ICC library)

<sup>102</sup> *Monthly Tarjuman-I-Quran*, February 2004, p.79-84 (ICC library)

<sup>103</sup> *Monthly Tarjuman-I-Quran* March 1997, p. 41-51 (ICC library)

gender-segregated areas for praying and socializing. There are separate classes in the Quran for males and females. Women are asked to wear hijab and openly criticized by elderly women for not doing so. One mosque, IMQ, even sells hijab at a very low price.

### **Women's Participation in Labour Force**

Most of the literature in the libraries discourages, even condemns, women's participation in the labour market and urges that women restrict themselves to domestic chores and child caring. Some literature argues explicitly that women's participation will:<sup>104</sup>

- increase male unemployment
- retard the pace of development by employing incompetent people (women) in jobs (the writer assumes that women are mentally and physically inferior to men)
- trigger sexual anarchy and chaos in men

Literature also deplores the fact that young Muslim men today prefer to marry women who are earning a living.<sup>105</sup> The writer argues that the men thereby shirk the obligation imposed upon them by Islam to support their wives.<sup>106</sup> Some literature says that women may be allowed to have jobs, but only if the following conditions are met:<sup>107</sup>

- She must wear hijab
- She must have her husband's permission
- She must not travel on business with men who are not relatives
- Her workplace must be strictly sex-segregated
- There should be no disruption of her domestic responsibilities (cooking, cleaning, washing, caring for children and elderly and sex services to husband) as a result of her holding down a job
- If she has to talk to men at work (colleagues, clients, etc.), the tone should not be soft and friendly

### **Women and Sports**

The literature argues that women's participation in sports should be discouraged.<sup>108</sup> We have heard of Muslim immigrant parents in Norway who have prevented their daughters from learning to swim: the girls' swimsuits violated Islam. Such prohibitions are recommended by the literature in the mosques.

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<sup>104</sup> *Feminist Movement and Islam*, p. 179-190 (ICC library).

<sup>105</sup> *Monthly Tarjuman-I-Quran*, August 2004, p42 (ICC library).

<sup>106</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>107</sup> *Monthly Tarjuman-I-Quran*, September 2005, p. 69

<sup>108</sup> *Contemporary Problems and Tahirul Qadri*, p. 12 (IMQ library)

### **Co-education**

The literature argues that co-education at all levels (schools, college and university) is in violation of Islam, because it leads to sexual perversion and moral waywardness.<sup>109</sup> Also, co-education lowers educational standards, because students become more interested in the opposite sex than in learning.<sup>110</sup>

The literature stresses there should be separate educational institutions for girls and boys all the way from primary school to the university level.<sup>111</sup> It is pertinent to mention that there are separate classes in Islam for girls and boys at ICC and IMQ.

### **Music and Film**

The literature argues that Islam disapproves of music and that all films lead to sexual perversion, except those that depict the greatness of Islam.<sup>112</sup>

### **Working in banks**

Some writings discourage employment in banks where most financial transactions are based on interest, which is forbidden in Islam.<sup>113</sup>

## **4.7 Honour Killing**

The literature does not condone honour killing, but it does support the ideology of honour, that is, the notion that a woman is the embodiment of her family's honour.<sup>114</sup> "The West makes a great hue and cry when a girl is killed for reasons of honour," reads one text, "and altogether ignores how she might have tarnished the family honour. The family is left with no choice but to kill the girl after she refuses to head the pleas and advice of her family."<sup>115</sup> The same text goes on to say: "Honour is the difference between the East and the West: sexual freedom is part of the culture in the West, whereas sex is regulated in the East and honour is an integral part of the regulation."<sup>116</sup>

To discourage honour killing, the literature makes two suggestions:

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<sup>109</sup> *The Women's Movement and its Negative Impact in the Light of Human Wisdom and Sharia*, p.19-33 (ICC library)

<sup>110</sup> Ibid.

<sup>111</sup> *Contemporary Problems and Tahirul Qadri*, p. 52 and 53. (IMQ library)

<sup>112</sup> *Contemporary Problems and Tahirul Qadri*, p.7 and 8 (IMQ library)

<sup>113</sup> *Monthly Tarjuman-I-Quran*, December 2003, p.94-95 (ICC library)

<sup>114</sup> *Monthly Minjaul Quran*, July 2005, p.70 (ICC library)

<sup>115</sup> Ibid.

<sup>116</sup> *Feminist Movement and Islam*, p.460

- children should be married off at the earliest opportunity (when they have attained puberty)
- if a girl is “rebellious”, she should be put under “house arrest” by her parents and be given at once in marriage to the man she is in love with.

The only thing the parents should carefully check is the man’s religion, i.e. to verify that he is a Muslim.<sup>117</sup>

#### 4.8 Women’s Movement

The libraries are full of literature that describes feminism as a movement for “woman’s waywardness, the murder of motherhood, and the elimination of the wifely role.”<sup>118</sup> Gender equality is unnatural and can never be achieved.<sup>119</sup> The notion of equality between men and women is a fraud, a trap promulgated by the West to destroy the Islamic family system.<sup>120</sup> Gender equality and Islam are mutually exclusive: you need to relinquish one in order to have the other.<sup>121</sup>

The literature also rejects as the antithesis of Islam the UN women’s agenda that was agreed upon at the 1995 Beijing Women’s Conference.<sup>122</sup> The leader of Minhajul Quran, Tahirul Qadri, led a rally against the Beijing agenda in Pakistan. A complete videotape of this rally can be bought in the library at ICC.<sup>123</sup> We have seen the video, in which an emotionally charged Tahirul Qadri rejects the Beijing agenda as part of the Western assault on Islam.

#### 4.9 Violent Jihad

Islam’s founder Mohammad is believed to have said: “Allah has forbidden the fire of hell for two groups among my people: one that will wage jihad against the Christians and the other against Hindus.”<sup>124</sup> An Urdu book glorifying violent jihad against non-Muslims, opens with this saying of Muhammad.<sup>125</sup> It further says: “If an Islamic country is attacked by infidels, jihad

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<sup>117</sup> Ibid.

<sup>118</sup> *The Feminist Movement and Islam*, p.50

<sup>119</sup> *The Feminist Movement and Islam*, p.72

<sup>120</sup> *The Feminist Movement and Islam*, p.27

<sup>121</sup> *The Feminist Movement and Islam*, p.74

<sup>122</sup> “*Dunya Bher Ki Auraton Ki Nam*” (ICC library)

<sup>123</sup> The videocassette is “People’s March and Women’s Rights Rally,” Lahore, PAT 79

<sup>124</sup> The hadith is from *Al-Nasai*, a *hadith* book. A book urging Muslims to wage violent jihad against non-Muslims (*Tehrek Kashmir Ki Sharai Hesiyyat*) opens with this hadith. (ICC library)

<sup>125</sup> The book is *Kashmir Movement in the Light of Sharia*, published by the teachers’ wing of *Jumaat Islami*. We found this book in the library at ICC.

becomes an obligation for all the people of that country. In case the Muslims of that country are too few in number, too weak, or even too unwilling to wage jihad, then Muslim from neighbouring countries shall come forward for the jihad. In case this, too, is not enough, then it is the duty of Muslims from all over the world to bolster that jihad.”<sup>126</sup> The book also argues that “should Muslims ignore jihad, they will end up in humiliation” at hands of the non-Muslims.

Another booklet proclaims the following: “There is only one solution to all the problems of the Muslims: [violent] jihad [against non-Muslims and Muslims not confirming to the violent jihad ideology].”<sup>127</sup> Similarly, another book<sup>128</sup> praises acts of terrorism by the Islamic militants who are currently being killed in acts of jihad. The book proudly declares that those Islamic militants belonged to the Jumaat Islami. Also, a booklet<sup>129</sup> urges Muslims to support violent jihad in Palestine, Afghanistan, Bosnia, and Chechnya, at least indirectly by contributing funds for jihad activities and by spreading the message of jihad to family members and neighbours and in educational institutions. Some literatures openly requests donations to support violent jihad.<sup>130</sup>

Some books even venerate women who were responsible for the deaths of their men (sons, husbands, or brothers) in jihad, or who have provided shelter to Islamic militants, or who themselves have physically participated in jihad in Bosnia, Palestine, Kashmir, etc.<sup>131</sup>

Generally speaking, the message of jihad for women that is contained in the literature in ICC’s library, is the same message that was recently given by a key Al-Qaeda leader, Abu Mosa Al Zarqavi, when he urged Muslim women to persuade their husbands to wage jihad against infidels.<sup>132</sup> The literature also tells stories of women who killed their anti-jihad brothers in order to save the lives of Islamic militants, and stories of wives who deserted their husbands in order to participate in jihad.<sup>133</sup> It is also pertinent to note that the leaders of ICC’s parent party in Pakistan, Jumaat Islami, has announced a prize in thousands of rupees for anyone who will wage jihad and kill the Danish cartoonists who drew cartoons of Islam’s founder, Muhammed, in the Danish daily Jyllands-Posten.<sup>134</sup>

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<sup>126</sup> Ibid., p.30.

<sup>127</sup> *The Jugular Vain of Pakistan: Kashmir*. p. 14 (ICC library)

<sup>128</sup> *Shaheed Commandos* (ICC library)

<sup>129</sup> *Jihad Ki Pukar*, see p.7 (ICC library)

<sup>130</sup> For example, the advertisement for donation in ‘Kashmir Jihad Fund’ on p.56 of Monthly *Tarjuman-I-Quran*. August 2002.

<sup>131</sup> For example, *The Slaughterhouse of Bosnia and Kashmir, and Jihad in Kashmir and Women* (ICC library)

<sup>132</sup> A message by Al Zarqavi, “Does the Religion Wane While I am Still Alive,” at <http://siteinstitute.org/bin/articles.cgi?ID=publications64705&Category=publications&Subcategory=0>

<sup>133</sup> For example, *The Slaughterhouse of Bosnia and Kashmir, and Jihad in Kashmir and Women* (ICC library)

<sup>134</sup> *Jumaat Islami’s* official Urdu daily *Jasarat*, November 15, 2005.



One major book used in IMQ Islamic classes, for both men and women, has an entire chapter on the virtue of violent jihad.<sup>135</sup> Tahirul Qadri, the religious-political leader and founder of Minhajul Quran, is the book's author. Quoting heavily from hadith, the sayings of Muhammed, the book says that participation in jihad is rewarded in both life and death: if the jihadi is killed, he will be rewarded with paradise; if not, he will have a share in the material riches acquired by Muslims in the holy war.<sup>136</sup> On another page, the book presents a conversation between God and the jihadis killed in jihad. After having granted the jihadis all the riches of paradise, God asks them: "Is there anything else you wish for?" Ecstatic over the rewards of jihad in paradise, they say: "God, send us back to the world to wage jihad again and be killed again."<sup>137</sup>

Quoting another saying of Muhammed, the book lists five rewards for a Muslim killed in jihad: one, his sins will be forgiven the moment his blood touches the ground; two, he will be spared God's punishment in the grave; three, he will be protected from the great fears that will engulf all people (dead or alive) on the day of judgment; four, he will be married to virgins in paradise; five, 70 members of his family will be forgiven by God.<sup>138</sup> Another hadith warns that Muslim who refuse to wage jihad, assist those waging jihad, or support the families of jihadis risk divine punishment.<sup>139</sup>

#### **4.10 Two-Nation Theory**

There is also literature that urges Muslims to see humanity as being divided into two "nations": Those who embrace Islam form one nation and those who reject Islam belong to another nation, "irrespective of their poise intentions and noble deeds".<sup>140</sup>

Such literature, we believe, can further prevent the already slow process of integration by Muslim immigrants in Norway. It strengthens the Islamic ideological foundation for the creation of a parallel society in Norway, a society whose members forge alliances with like-minded Muslims around the globe, but who perceive their fellow countrymen, the non-Muslim ethnic Norwegians and followers of other religions, as the "other."

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<sup>135</sup> *Islami Tarbiyati Nisab*, p.205-216 (IMQ library)

<sup>136</sup> *Ibid.*, p.207

<sup>137</sup> *Ibid.*, p.209

<sup>138</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 212 - 213

<sup>139</sup> *Ibid.*, p.8

<sup>140</sup> *Islam the State Religion*, p.9 (IMQ library).

### **Public Disputation in Denmark**

In the library at IMQ, literature<sup>141</sup> recounts a public disputation between Tahirul Qadri and some Christian ministers as to “whether Islam or Christianity was the true religion.” Qadri represented Islam; the Danish ministers represented Christianity.

First, according to the book, the ministers asked questions about the authenticity of the Quran that were all answered “satisfactorily” by Qadri. Then Qadri asked questions about “inconsistencies” in the Bible, which were not “satisfactorily” answered by the ministers. The latter even lost their composure during the subsequent series of cross-questions, the book claims. In the end, it was proven that the Quran was the “real” divine book, “free” of any inconsistency or discrepancy and that the Bible, in its current form, was just a “storybook.” According to the book, the Danish audience at the disputation, including some Christian ministers, were “impressed” by the arguments put forward by Qadri, and their misunderstandings of Islam were “eliminated.” It also reports that arrangements will be made to disseminate a videotape of the disputation to everybody in Denmark, and claims that the disputation made the young Danish Muslims in the audience, in particular, “proud” of Islam.

### **4.11 Punishment and Intolerance**

Muhammed is supposed to have said: “The blood of a Muslim who confesses that none has the right to be worshipped but Allah and that I am His Apostle, cannot be shed except in three cases: as retribution for murder, for committing illegal sexual intercourse outside of marriage, and for reverting from Islam (apostasy) and leaving the Muslim fold.”<sup>142</sup>

There is a text in the library that justifies the killing of a Muslim who repudiates Islam and becomes an apostate: “although with heavy heart, he (a Muslim who repudiates Islam) should be chopped off (killed) from the wider Islamic society. Following this process of purification (killing of the apostate) the Muslim society will start a new life with only those Muslim who are in agreement with Islam.”<sup>143</sup> Its author is Maududi, the founder of Jumaat Islami.

### **Intolerance of Ahmadis**

Some literature preaches intolerance against Ahmadis, a Muslim sect now declared non-Muslim under Pakistani law.<sup>144</sup> For example, Muslims are urged not to eat, drink, or socialize

<sup>141</sup> Manazira Denmark, Qadri, Tahirul (2002).

<sup>142</sup> Volume 9, Book 83, Number 17: *Sahih Bukhari*

<sup>143</sup> Chapters two, three, and four in the *Punishment of Apostate*, P.76 (ICC library)

<sup>144</sup> A Muslim sect that has been declared non-Muslim in Pakistan

in any manner with Ahmadis. Those who show such tolerance to Ahmadis are inviting the wrath of Allah.<sup>145</sup>

### **Homosexuality**

Some literature argues that homosexuals should be killed.<sup>146</sup> The literature appears to confuse homosexuality with pedophilia and suggests that company with rich “boys” should be avoided because sometimes they can be more dangerous (sexually speaking) than women.<sup>147</sup>

## **4.12 Family Planning**

Muhammed is supposed to have said: “Marry and multiply, for I will be proud of your multitude on the Day of Judgment.”<sup>148</sup>

Women with whom we talked at ICC and IMQ preferred, more often than not, to use contraception and to have a few children rather than many.

Yet we found that the literature in the library at ICC rejects family planning and urges Muslims to grow in number as a spiritual duty to defeat the “enemies of Islam” who are bent upon reducing Muslims’ numerical strength.<sup>149</sup> The literature accords a spiritual status to the hardships of pregnancy and childbirth, and says that women will be rewarded in the life hereafter for enduring these hardships.<sup>150</sup> At the mosques, it appears, women are encouraged to take pride in having many children. This, on the one hand, may entrap women in a permanent state of pregnancy.

The literature in the IMQ library also rejects the use of contraceptives for the purpose of restricting family size.<sup>151</sup> It does allow family planning, however, if one or more of the following conditions are met:<sup>152</sup>

- when excessive pregnancies cause a deterioration in a woman’s health and the doctor prescribes the use of contraceptives to control this deterioration

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<sup>145</sup> *The Qadiani Funeral* (ICC library)

<sup>146</sup> *Feminist Movement and Islam*, p.136-137

<sup>147</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>148</sup> This *hadith* is located at: <http://muslim-canada.org/rauf.htm>

<sup>149</sup> *Monthly Tarjuman-I-Quran* August 2005, p.82.(ICC library)

<sup>150</sup> For example, the Urdu language booklet *Bachaon Ki Tarbiat* (ICC library)

<sup>151</sup> *Contemporary Problems and Tarirul Qadri*, p.55

<sup>152</sup> *Ibid.*

- when excessive pregnancies become the cause of stillbirths, endanger the survival of a newborn baby, or permanently atrophy the health of a child for the rest of his life
- when the number of children reaches a limit beyond which the father cannot maintain them financially as prescribed by Allah.

#### **4.13 Dispute Resolution**

We have come to know that some mosques aspire to resolve disputes concerning marriage, divorce, and child custody by following Islamic law. If true, this represents a clear infringement of Norwegian law: Norwegian courts should resolve such cases in accordance with Norwegian law. This is a serious situation, given that Islamic law, as indicated by the above-quoted text, is not always compatible with Norwegian law. The mosques, in short, may have taking on a role similar to that of the Sharia Councils of Britain. Just like the Sharia Councils, the Norwegian mosques may be creating arenas in which Islamic law will compete with Norwegian law. Just as in Britain, where the Muslim community pressures disputing parties to take their legal problems to the Sharia Councils rather than to British courts, we fear that mosques in Norway will pressure disputing parties to resolve their disputes at mosques rather than in Norwegian courts.<sup>153</sup>

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<sup>153</sup> This also actually happened in 2003, when there was a debate in media concerning Muslim women's lack of rights for divorce and hence trapped in unwanted marriages. Several Muslim leaders and also politicians representing the Government, promoted a kind of sharia council to solve the problems, in the sense that women could apply a council for divorce if the husband denied them divorce from the Muslim marriage contract (NTB 27.05.03).

## 5 Sammendrag og forslag til tiltak

I denne rapporten har vi satt søkelyset på hvilke verdier, spesielt knyttet til kjønnsroller, men også på demokrati i lys av hellig krig og martyrdøm, som formidles i to moskeer i Norge, Islamic Cultural Center (ICC) og Idara Minhaj-ul-Quran (IMQ), begge lokalisert med hovedkontor i Oslo. ICC er direkte tilknyttet det religionspolitiske partiet Jumaat Islami i Pakistan. Idara Minhaj-ul-Quran er en del av en verdensomspennende religionspolitisk bevegelse med hovedkvarter i Pakistan, som også har et eget religionpolitisk parti. Begge partiene arbeider for et islamsk verdensherredømme, basert på to-nasjons teoriene, der muslimer utgjør den ene og ledende nasjonen (umma, de troendes fellesskap), som styrer etter islamsk lovverk, sharia, som er utledet av fortolkninger av koranen og islams stifter Muhammeds sedvane og uttalelser, mens den andre nasjonen er ikke-muslimer og undersätter.

Gitt menighetenes direkte tilknytning til religionspolitiske partier i Pakistan, har vi gått gjennom bakgrunnen til disse partiene, deres verdigrunnlag, og sett spesielt på holdninger til flerkoneri (polygami), relasjonen mellom mann og hustru, skilsmisse, arvefordeling, kvinners status som vitner, holdning til FNs konvensjon om "arbeid mot alle former for diskriminering" (Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women, CEDAW), Haddod (Islamske straffelover i Pakistan), familieplanlegging, æresdrap, tvangsekteskap, tildekking av kvinner, kvinners rolle i islamske menigheter så vel som i (religiøse) politiske partier, kvinner i sport, kvinner i reklame, bruk av politisk vold, holdninger til media og holdninger til voldelig hellige krig.

Gjennomgangen avdekker at de religionspolitiske partiene i Pakistan forfekter holdninger som er gjennomgående kjønnsdiskriminerende, brudd med FNs menneskerettighetskonvensjoner, og at disse holdningene og verdiene viderefremmes og videreføres i tilgjengelig litteratur i menighetene lokalisert i Norge. Det forfektes også holdninger og praksiser som er i direkte strid med norsk lov. Dette gjenspeiles også i samtaler med kvinner vi møtte i moskeene, der vi snakket om deres rettigheter innen islam: Kvinnene reflekterte i liten grad over at litteraturen i mosken ikke samsvarer med kvinners rettigheter i et moderne demokrati som Norge. Riktignok hadde noen yngre kvinner synspunkter på arveretten i islam, da de hadde problemer med å forstå praksisen med at de ikke kunne arve alt etter foreldrene dersom de ikke hadde brødre. De samme kvinnene uttrykte en viss skepsis til islamske lover, men de formidlet ingen argumenter i forhold til å ta avstand fra, eventuelt bekjempe, kjønnsdiskrimineringen i islamsk lov. Sistnevnte er kanskje

ikke så underlig, da kamp for like rettigheter for kvinner og menn fordømmes på det sterkeste med henvisning til at det fører til ødeleggelse av den "riktige" familiestrukturen, den islamske, der kvinner er underordnet mannen.

Kjønnsdiskrimineringen kommer også klart frem knyttet til (det islamske) ekteskapet. Litteraturen vektlegger å formidle hvordan muslimer skal unngå romantiske følelser. Ideelt sett skal en mann ikke møte sin kone før ekteskapet inngås, men innhente opplysninger om henne fra sin mor, søster, tante etc. Videre heter det at familiene skal arrangere ekteskapet så fort jenter er i puberteten, i tillegg til at tilgjengelig litteratur understreker viktigheten av at kvinnen må ha tillatelse fra ett mannlige familiemedlem for å inngå ekteskapet. Kvinnene i moskeene var også klar over at det i islam er forbudt for dem å gifte seg med en ikke-muslim. De gav uttrykk for at dette forbudet er helt greit. Samtidig mente flere at skandinaviske menn var bedre ektefeller enn muslimske menn - i forhold til likestilling mellom kjønnene. I samtaler med kvinner i moskeene fortalte også flere at de ønsket å bruke prevensjon som ledd i familieplanleggingen, men litteraturen avviser all form for familieplanlegging. Kvinners stilling i ekteskapet styrkes heller ikke av at flerkoneri (polygami) er tillatt og aktivt støttes oppunder, endog med litteratur på norsk. Litteraturen forfekter også enstydig at en kvinnes skilsmisserettigheter er begrenset, i tråd med bredt akseptert islamsk tolkning.

Mannens autoritet overfor kvinnene kommer også frem ved at litteraturen viser til mannens rett til å slå kvinnen. Så kan det selvsagt diskuteres om disse slagene kan utføres med en q-tips eller annet redskap, men uansett sier denne "delegerte retten" noe om holdninger knyttet til kvinnes rolle og plass i familien og samfunnet forøvrig. Dette kommer også frem i forhold til praksisen med atskillelse (segregasjon) mellom kvinner og menn i det offentlige rom: Det er kvinners seksualitet som "forstyrrer" menn. Derfor pålegges kvinner streng kleskodeks, som i Norge er mest utbredt gjennom hijab, da den både tjener til at menn ikke "distrahers ved seksuell opphisselse", samt at kvinner (og jentebarn) samtidig viser sin muslimske tilhørighet. Det synes å være liten tvil om at det er menns tilbøyelighet til å la seg "friste av kvinnen", og at det er kvinnens hovedansvar å forhindre at menn fristes, som er det sterkeste argumentet for tildekning av kvinner og segregering av kjønnene.

I forhold til hva litteraturen i moskeene formidler, er det mange kriterier en muslimsk kvinne bør innfri hvis hun er på arbeidsmarkedet, utover at hun må ha mannens tillatelse til å jobbe. Dette omfatter krav om å ikle seg hijab, om kjønnsegregert arbeidsplass, og hvis hun snakker med mannlige kollegaer bør tonen ikke være (for) myk og vennlig. Hun må heller ikke dra på tjenestereise med menn som ikke er hennes slektninger. Dessuten må jobben ikke være av en slik karakter at det går ut over hennes plikter hjemme, spesifisert som matlaging, hus- og klesvask, omsorg for barna og barneoppdragelse, samt seksuelle tjenester for mannen.

I tillegg til overnevnte reagerer HRS' representanter på litteraturen i menighetene som fremmer og forsvarer voldelig jihad, og som endog benyttes i islamundervisning av menn og kvinner Idara Minhaj-ul-Quran. Videre reageres det på litteratur som forfekter straff og intoleranse mot muslimer som ikke følger islamske leveregler og lover, inkludert at en frafallen muslim kan drepes, og at homofile bør drepes. Litteraturen fordømmer heller ikke æresdrap. De reagerte også på den rollen som moskeene påtar seg i konflikter forbundet med ekteskap, skilsmisse og omsorg for barn, som langt på vei ble oppfattet som et shariaråd. Med andre ord oppfattes det dit hen at muslimer i Norge rådføres til å løse konflikter knyttet til ekteskapet, skilsmisse eller barn i moskeen heller enn i norsk rett.

Det reageres også på at det ikke finnes litteratur i disse menighetene som forfekter annet enn konservativ tolkning av islam, en tolkning som korresponderer med islamisters holdninger og verdier. Menighetenes fremste lederskikkelser, for Idara Minhaj-ul-Ouran, Tahirul Qadri, og for Islamic Cultural Centre, Qazi Hussain Ahmad, er begge fremtredende islamister i Pakistan med internasjonal innflytelse, og deres uttalte ideologi er islamsk verdensherredømme. Det er ikke mulig å oppdrive informasjon i de to menighetene som stiller kritiske spørsmål ved lederskikkelsenes uttalte ideologi. Tvert om er det en unison støtte til og hyllest av lederskikkelsene, som kommer frem både i litteraturen og informasjonen menighetene distribuerer, inkludert på deres websider, og som også kommer til uttrykk når lederne har vært på besøk i Norge, jamfør feiringen av Qazi Hussain Ahmad da han besøkte Norge i august 2004.

En av HRS' representanter etterspurte litteratur i ICC for undervisning av barn, og ble blant annet tildelt litteratur som støtter opp under polygami, segregering av kvinner og menn, at kvinner er underordnet ektemannen, og der det oppfordres til hellig krig mot fiender. Det var moskeens imam personlig som anbefalte denne litteraturen for undervisning av barn.<sup>154</sup>

## 5.1 Mulige tiltak

Prosjektgruppens oppfatning er at den tilgjengelige litteraturen (hovedsakelig kommunisert på urdu) i bøker, pamfletter, tidsskrifter etc., og fra audiovisuelle media som lyd-kassetter og video, samt innholdet på aktuelle websider, er "religiøs litteratur med politiske føringer". Religionspolitiske føringer er i denne sammenheng spesielt knyttet til standarder for atferd i det offentlige rom mellom kjønnene, samt at det er åpenbart at konservative islamske lover

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<sup>154</sup> Da dette ikke er prosjektlederen, er det ikke nevnt i den engelske delen av rapporten. All denne litteraturen er på norsk, og omhandler blant annet heftet, "Polygami (flerkoneri) i islam", og boken "Islams fundament" av Abul Ala Maududi, som forfektet et totalitært prestestyre med et fascistisk preg, og som grunnla Jumaat Islami. Maududi anses som en av de mest sentrale inspirasjonskildene til fremveksten av militant islam.

og regler, særlig knyttet til ekteskap, skilsmisse, og arv, heves over norsk lov. Som nevnt innledningsvis, støtter ikke nødvendigvis alle som er medlemmer i menighetene de påpekte verdier, normer og praksiser som formidles, men ut fra samtaler med kvinner i moskeene kan det synes som det er svært få som er kritiske til verdigrunnlaget som promottes, og de etterlyste heller ikke annen litteratur/informasjon.

Konklusjonen er at moskeene ikke fremmer kvinners rettigheter, men heller formidler litteratur og informasjon som hemmer at kvinnene for oppfylt sine rettigheter på lik linje med mennene, hvilket er i motsetning til idealet i det norske samfunnet. Resultatet kan bli at det i Norge etableres ulike standarder og rettigheter for kvinner med ulik opprinnelse. På dette grunnlag viser prosjektlederen nulltoleranse overfor moskeene, og mener at det bør være mulig både å innføre forbud mot brudepris (meher), forbud mot hilala, samt gjennomgang og kontroll med menighetenes litteratur og annen informasjon (opp mot norsk lov), og krav om at kvinners rettigheter i Norge formidles både i så vel moskeene som i media. Prosjektlederen er også av den oppfatning at hijab må forbys i grunnskolen, og advarer på det sterkeste mot islamske kjønnsdelte skoler i Norge.

HRS har forståelse for prosjektlederens ønske om å utvise nulltoleranse knyttet til de forhold som er avdekket i rapporten, og derav hennes langt på vei kompromissløse tiltak for at ikke diskriminerende praksiser skal befestes seg i et moderne demokrati som Norge. Men det kan nok stilles spørsmålsteget ved hvorvidt en praksis forsvinner ved å forby den, samtidig som det er vanskelig for staten å kontrollere (og avvise) litteratur i religiøse menigheter, relatert til andre sentrale rettigheter som eksempelvis religions- og ytringsfriheten.

Religiøs frihet innebærer også at det er vanskelig for myndighetene å kontrollere hvilke verdier og normer som formidles internt i menigheten, selv om disse kolliderer med norsk lov eller er regelrett lovstridig. At ulike religiøse grupperinger mottar økonomisk støtte for sin virksomhet, kan vanskelig gjøres til et sanksjoneringsmiddel uten at det innføres kontrollrutiner, som igjen kan være vanskelig å håndtere.

#### **Konkrete tiltak:**

Norske myndigheter har over lang tid fremmet dialog som et sentralt virkemiddel for å få til et velfungerende fleretnisk og flerreligiøst samfunn i Norge. HRS er av den klare mening at vårt politiske lederskap ikke har noen plikt til å føre dialog med religiøse ledere, særlig når disse religiøse lederne har klare politiske målsettinger. Sammenblanding av politikk og religion mener vi er i motstrid til det sekulære norske demokratiets grunnpilarer og forutsetninger. Dialogen bør heller foregå mellom religiøse ledere innen religiøse institusjoner. Den blandingen vi har opplevd av politikk og religion, særlig ved den kontinuerlige dialogen med



muslimske ledere, er med på å danne og forsterke et bilde av folk med røtter i den islamske verden, som først og fremst religiøse vesener, og ikke først og fremst samfunnsborgere på linje med andre borgere. HRS mener heller konkrete tiltak bør settes i gang for å bedre integreringen.

I et integreringsperspektiv er de påviste holdningene til kvinner i aktivt arbeidsliv svært uheldige. Arbeid er en sentral sosialiseringarena til deltakelse generelt i det norske samfunnet til å få oppfylt grunnleggende menneskerettigheter og til å oppfylle sine plikter. Også i et samfunnsøkonomisk perspektiv er det svært uheldig at store grupper holdes utenfor – uansett årsak. Statistisk er det særlig en del grupper kvinner med røtter i muslimske land som har lav yrkesdeltakelse. Her må myndighetene gå inn med aktive virkemidler.

Av konkrete tiltak vil vi peke på følgende:

\* Myndighetene må sette kvinners rettigheter på den offentlige agendaen. I en slik sammenheng vil informasjon om norske lover og regler viktig, og staten bør ta initiativ til at det trykkes brosjyrer som formidler kvinners rettigheter i forhold til sentrale faktorer som ekteskap, skilsmisse, barnfordeling, arv, polygami, at det ikke er lov å utøve vold etc. Disse brosjyrene, som også må formidles på urdu, bør i tillegg til å gjøres tilgjengelig i moskeene, være tilgjengelige på andre steder hvor kvinnene kan treffes (helsekontrollstasjoner, legekontor, trygdekontorer, skoler og annet).

\* Myndighetene må aktivt stimulere til større åpenhet og debatt i det norske samfunnet verdier og normer særlig knyttet til likestilling, likeverd, ytringsfrihet og religiøs frihet. Det må føres en debatt på et likeverdig nivå, det vil si at den tendensen vi har registrert til å sette grupper i offerrolle, må unngås. En slik holdning er på sitt verste diskriminerende.

\* Vel så viktig som at staten tar initiativ til informasjonsspredning og offentlig debatt om verdier, normer og praksiser, må også vårt politiske lederskap ta standpunkt til det religiøse aspektet som i økende grad tar plass i det offentlige rom. Ikke minst er dette knyttet til religiøse symboler som hijab. HRS har tidligere tatt til ordet for forbud mot prangende religiøse symboler i den offentlige grunnskolen, da nettopp for å sikre at barn kan få være barn, uten å måtte bære eller formidle sine foreldre/foresattes religiøse (politiske) standpunkter. At tildekning av jenter og kvinner promoterer av menighetene overfor medlemmene, samtidig som man har sett en betydelig økning i tildekkede jenter og kvinner i Oslos gater og på skolene, kan utvilsomt ha en sammenheng. Denne økende tildekningen er særlig tvilsom dersom den er et resultat av pådriv fra religionspolitiske krefter i menighetene

som er direkte tilknyttet religionspolitiske parti i Pakistan, med en ideologi om islamsk verdensherredømme, og der kvinner er annenrangs borgere. Dette aspektet burde norske myndigheter undersøke.

Fra tid til annen er det blitt foreslått at Norge bør tillate at familiesaker blant muslimer, knyttet særlig til kvinners begrensede adgang til skilsmisse, løses ved opprettelse av et råd/domstol basert på islamsk lovgivning, jamfør forslag fra forrige regjering (Se for eksempel "Utredning norsk shariaråd", VG 25.mai 2003). HRS vil fraråde Regjeringen å tillate etablering av religiøse organ som gjennom religiøst lovverk skal råde eller dømme i ekteskapelige eller andre tvister. I denne sammenhengen er ideen om et shariaråd særlig udemokratisk, da det kun er kvinner som eventuelt skulle søke bistand hos et slikt råd, all den tid menn har full tilgang på enkel og rask skilsmisse fra den religiøse ekteskapskontrakten. Det er viktig at Regjeringen viser en klar prinsipiell holdning i slike spørsmål. HRS mener Regjeringen bør undersøke om menigheter allerede har etablert slike organ. Hvis det viser seg at slike organ er i funksjon, må nødvendige tiltak settes inn for å avvikle dem.

\* Litteraturen som brukes i undervisning av barn, ungdom, kvinner og menn, bør gjennomgås av myndighetene ut fra informasjon om at blant annet litteraturen oppfordrer til væpnet hellig krig, og også promoterer islamsk lovverk og praksis som bryter med norsk lov, da for eksempel flerkoneri.

\* Det bør være formålstjenlig å vurdere om rettsapparatet skal etterprøve om innholdet i litteraturen som brukes i undervisning i menighetene er rettsstridig.

\* Det bør vurderes om litteraturen og informasjonen som distribueres er av en slik ensidig lovstridig karakter, og i motstrid til ratifiserte menneskerettighetskonvensjoner inkorporert i norsk lov, at den offentlige økonomiske støtten til menighetene må opphøre.

\* Det bør også vurderes å undersøke om de religionspolitiske verdier, holdninger og lover som er fundamentet i menighetene, er i så graverende motstrid til det norske sekulære demokratiet og rettsstaten, at menighetene må lukkes.

\* Myndighetene bør ta et velfundamentert standpunkt om hvorvidt religionspolitiske leder, med islamsk verdensherredømme som mål, skal tillates innreise til Norge, jamfør at for eksempel Qazi Hussain Ahmad, leder av Jumaat Islami, er nektet innreise i Nederland og Tyskland.

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*Tarjuman-I-Quran*, August 2004. This is the Urdu monthly of *Jumaat-I-Islami* that is published in Pakistan and sent to the overseas branches of the party, including ICC. We got this from ICC Oslo.

*Tarjuman-I-Quran*, November 1998. This is the Urdu monthly of *Jumaat-I-Islami* that is published in Pakistan and sent to the overseas branches of the party, including ICC. We got this from ICC Oslo.

*Tarjuman-I-Quran*, September 2005. This is the Urdu monthly of *Jumaat-I-Islami* that is published in Pakistan and sent to the overseas branches of the party, including ICC. We found this in ICC Oslo.

*Tarjuman-I-Quran*, February 2004. This is the Urdu monthly of *Jumaat-I-Islami* that is published in Pakistan and sent to the overseas branches of the party, including ICC. We found this in ICC Oslo.

*Tarjuman-I-Quran*, March 1997. This is the Urdu monthly of *Jumaat-I-Islami* that is published in Pakistan and sent to the overseas branches on the party, including ICC. We found this in ICC Oslo.

*Tarjuman-I-Quran*, July 2005. This is the Urdu monthly of *Jumaat-I-Islami* that is published in Pakistan and sent to the overseas branches on the party, including ICC. We found this in ICC Oslo.

*Tarjuman-I-Quran*, August 2002. This is the Urdu monthly of *Jumaat-I-Islami* that is published in Pakistan and sent to the overseas branches of the party, including ICC. We found this in ICC Oslo.

*Tarjuman-I-Quran*, December 2003. This is the Urdu monthly of *Jumaat-I-Islami* that is published in Pakistan and sent to the overseas branches of the party, including ICC. We found this in ICC Oslo.

*Tarjuman-I-Quran*, August 2005. This is the Urdu monthly of *Jumaat-I-Islami* that is published in Pakistan and sent to the overseas branches on the party, including ICC. We found this in ICC Oslo.

Tasneem, Bushra, *Bachaon Ki Tarbiat* (The Rearing of Children), Lahore: *Jumaat Islami* Pakistan

*Tehrek Kashmir Ki Sharai Hesiya* (Kashmir Movement in the Light of Sharia). This is an Urdu-language booklet published by the teachers' wing of *Jumaat Islami*, called *Tanzem Asateza* (teachers' organization). This booklet justifies violent jihad in the light of Quranic verses and the sayings of Muhammed. It urges Muslims to inflict jihad on infidels until all are slaughtered or subdued.

Ullah, Fazal, 1995, *Jihad Kashmir Aur Khawateen* (Jihad in Kashmir and Women), Pindi: Markaz Matbuat Kashmir. This is an Urdu book that narrates the stories of women who participated in violent Islamic jihad.

"Women's Role in an Islamic Society," The *Minhajul Quran* leader, Tahirul Qadri, gave a lecture on this topic, which is recorded on an audio cassette that can be available at *Minhajul Quran* centers in Pakistan and abroad. We managed to get this cassette from a *Minhajul Quran* madrassa (Islamic school) in Pakistan. The lecture is in Urdu.